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Taste as Feeling 
 
(Article forthcoming in New Literary History © Ben Highmore. This is the version 
before it has been copyedited and typeset. If citing this article or quoting from it, please 
used the published version.) 
 
Ben Highmore 
 
This article is premised on two presumptions. The first is, I think, uncontroversial, the 
second less so. The first presumption is that today, serious discussions about taste 
usually start out by rehearsing Pierre Bourdieu’s contribution to our understanding of 
how taste preferences operate in society. This then is merely to recognise that when 
Bourdieu first published books such as The Love of Art (1969, written with Alain 
Darbel) and Distinctions: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (1979) he was 
making a concerted intervention into debates about cultural value and challenging the 
philosophical understandings of taste based on such ideas as disinterested attention. 
Today Bourdieu is often the starting point for discussing taste, rather than invoked as a 
critical response to other starting points that might go by the name of Immanuel Kant, or 
David Hume, or Archibald Alison. The second, more contentious presumptions, is that 
Bourdieu was not actually interested in taste and rarely addressed its particular qualities 
in his work. Or to put it differently, Bourdieu was only interested in taste as a function 
of something else, and that something else was the generation and maintenance of social 
distinctions. This meant that tastes (particular choices, specific likings and dis-likings) 
were only ever relevant or worthy of note if they were already marked as having some 
sort of social distinction and value. It doesn’t take long to notice that such an approach 
requires the discounting of all those aspects of taste that might matter to tasters but that 
can’t be used to explain social differences: for instance, the way I much prefer 
strawberry jam to the raspberry variety, or why, out of all of John Coltrane’s albums I 
am always particularly drawn to his 1961 album Olé. Nor does it address questions of 
taste that might not be accessible through Bourdieu’s favoured method of the 
questionnaire; questions about overarching changes in taste that might mark one epoch 
from another, one national context from another. For Bourdieu, a taste that is shared by 
all would not be a taste at all. 
 These presumptions beg their own questions: how should we attend to taste if 
we want to apprehend the various modalities it can engender (indifference as much as 
vehemence)? How could we find an approach to taste that is flexible enough to 
apprehend what might be seen as micro-sensitivities (my liking for strawberry jam and 
the album Olé) as well as those macro-orchestrations that could include such 
phenomena as the ubiquitous taste for individualised technologies (from cars to smart 
phones) and the seemingly ubiquitous taste for “convenience”? Tastes, in other words, 
that might not best accessed by assessing their value as good or bad taste? And could 
such an approach (if it could be concocted) also apprehend what Freud called “the 
narcissism of minor differences,” differences that were foundational for Bourdieu’s 
questionnaires?1 Could it register what it feels like to be suspended in particular taste 
habits that mark you out as posh or crass or something in between: the culture that is 
vividly described by the English artist Grayson Perry when he writes, “we learn the 
texture of our place in the world from the curlicue of a neck tattoo, the clank of a Le 
Creuset casserole dish, or the scent of a mouldering hunting print.”2 
 Taste is often discussed as a force that drives and articulates identity. Accounts 
of taste might, for instance, put a good deal of emphasis on whether you like “wearing 
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silver instead of gold, or listening to Bach rather than Wagner or Pearl Jam rather than 
Elton John” because such choices “go to the core of who we are.”3 For some, at certain 
points in their life, allegiances to specific styles of music matter inordinately. At 
different times, under different circumstances, music tribalism might not matter at all. 
The “narcissism of minor differences” can obscure the more general manner in which 
we are sutured into the cultural logics of commodity culture, where we all partake in 
what might be considered ubiquitous tastes, hardly noticeable at all, apart from when 
you consider people who are excluded from the circulation of items now considered 
necessities (TVs, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, cars, and so on). If taste has been 
used as an optic for considering “status seeking” (and its inverse – “status shaming”), 
we should also consider treating taste as an optic for recognising how Jacques 
Rancière’s “distribution of the sensible” and Lauren Berlant’s “historical sensorium” 
have been generated by epochal attunements to new materials and affective relations.4 
This would mean treating taste as an agent that orchestrates sensibilities and that 
potentially alters our social environment (rather than simply reinforcing already 
established social relations) generating new liberating possibilities and new “coercive 
freedoms.”5  
In this article my aim is modest: I want to lay the groundwork for seeing taste as 
an agent of sensorial change by treating it as a feeling, or range of feelings. I realise that 
such a claim veers perilously close to being tautological: one of the oldest meanings of 
taste was to “touch or feel.”6 Both “feel” and “taste” simultaneously have both a literal 
sense (the tactile and gustatory sense experience) and a more modern metaphorical 
extension, such that you can talk about fine feeling without any requirement to relate 
this to tactility, or describe someone as having refined taste in something clearly 
unrelated to gustatory flavour. Both words, though, can also be used in a way that pairs 
sensate experience with a sense of learning and accomplishment, as in “I’m getting a 
feel for sailing”, which could just as easily be expressed as “I’m getting a taste for 
sailing”, and which would mean developing skills and aptitudes through practice. Both 
taste and feeling orientate attractions, shape sensibilities, and recalibrate attention. 
These meanings, which still circulate alongside ideas about taste as judgement, connect 
to an older of sense of taste meaning to “test”, to “sample” and to “experience”. In 
treating taste as feeling, then, I’m insisting that it is useful to connect taste to 
experiential meanings, ones that aren’t hemmed-in by the need to evaluate taste in terms 
of whether it is considered good or bad, elite or popular, polite or uncouth, and so on 
(this doesn’t mean abandoning evaluative judgements, it means opening up the 
judgement of taste to a much larger range of evaluations that don’t stand or fall on a 
single value). To show the productivity of this conjoining of taste and feeling I’m going 
to move through a small number of scenes, to sketch a prolegomenon for reconsidering 
the role of taste as feeling within culture.  
 
Feelings are Ordinary 
 
The phrase “structures of feeling” was used by Raymond Williams from the 
early 1950s onwards as a way of naming an investigation into social and cultural change 
that took literature and drama as its primary sources of evidence. He probably started 
thinking about “feelings”, as an approach for practicing cultural history and criticism, in 
the mid-1940s when he returned to the University of Cambridge to take up his final year 
of undergraduate study after he was demobbed at the end of the war. In looking back at 
that moment in Cambridge in 1945 he wrote that there he “found the new alternative 
sub-culture, which in English but also in Anthropology was the group around F. R. 
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Leavis.”7 Cambridge English in the 1930s and 40s was dominated by the figure of 
Leavis and the journal he edited, Scrutiny.8 Within this context the word “feelings” is 
part of a lexicon of terms that wants to treat novels and poems as part of a world of 
experience. Thus, writing in 1932 in New Bearings in English Poetry, Leavis can 
describe T. S. Eliot’s poetry as writing “that expresses freely a modern sensibility, the 
ways of feeling, the modes of experience, of one fully alive in his own age.”9 Here 
“feelings”, “sensibility” and “experience” are either synonymous or cognate terms. For 
Leavis, one of the ways of valuing literature is to see it as a distillation of experience, 
and thereby a successful poem could be described as articulating “refined” (in a literal 
rather than a judgemental sense) feelings, precisely because the task that literature 
undertakes is to refine or distil experience.   
It is part of a common understanding of Williams’ “structures of feeling” project 
that it combined Leavis’ approach to literature with an adherence to Marxism. It is 
tempting to see this “Left Leavisism”10 as establishing an equation whereby the word 
“feeling” drives the Leavis side of the equation, while “structures” points us to a 
Marxism that could be attentive to structuring activities such as the division of labour. 
My sense, though, is that the word “feeling” in the phrase points to a much more diverse 
set of concerns that were pertinent to both anthropology and the study of literature at 
this time (and within the limited milieu of Cambridge), and named phenomena that 
purposefully expanded the meaning that Leavis gave the term. This is not to say that 
Leavis wasn’t also informed by more anthropological discussions of feeling and 
experience; for instance, when, in the 1960s, he edited two anthologies made up of 
selections from Scrutiny he chose to begin the first volume with a long review by Q. D. 
Leavis (from 1943) of a biography of A. C. Haddon, the man who established 
anthropology at Cambridge early in the century.11 
“Cambridge English,” as it came to be known, might have been heavily 
associated with Leavis, but it was underwritten by the “practical criticism” established 
at Cambridge by I. A. Richards. For Richards “feeling” was a key term for analysing all 
utterances (alongside “sense”, “tone” and “intention”); it named the utterance’s attitude 
towards what it was referring to. For Richards “feeling” is “some special direction, bias, 
or accentuation of interest towards” the content and references of an utterance: it is that 
aspect of an utterance that demonstrates “some personal flavour or colouring of feeling; 
and we use language to express these feelings, this nuance of interest.”12 “Nuance of 
interest” suggests that feelings name the particular shape that a desire or a demand may 
take: its strength (or weakness), its focus (or diffusion), its density (or delicacy). Just to 
show how extensive the range of phenomena that could be included as feeling, Richards 
explains that: “under ‘feeling’ I group for convenience the whole conative-affective 
aspects of life – emotions, emotional attitudes, the will, desire, pleasure-unpleasure, and 
the rest. ‘Feeling’ is shorthand for any or all of this.”13 The conative-affective aspect is 
that animated realm of life (all our volition, propulsion, attraction and repulsion) that is 
not governed by rationalised thought. It is, in other words, the world least available to 
being represented as ideas, arguments, and thoughtful reflection.  
The realm of feeling, then, is an aspect of life that, within the reflexive world of 
intellectual writing, is often more gestured at than directly attended to. It is an aspect of 
life that Williams sometimes called the “lived,” an arena that he is constantly scrabbling 
around to find the right word for:   
 
The lived is only another word, if you like, for experience: but we have to find a 
word for that level. For all that is not fully articulated, all that comes through 
disturbance, tension, blockage, emotional trouble seem to me precisely a source 
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of major changes in the relation between the signifier and the signified, whether 
in literary language or conventions.14 
 
This is, in some regards, Williams extolling a form of vitalism that he sees as animating 
the living world of social communication and practice as well as literary forms. In 
choosing the term “feeling” over the word “experience” Williams is making a strategic 
move to avoid what he saw as the pitfalls of “these great blockbuster words like 
experience” which “can have very unfortunate effects over the rest of the argument.”15 
The unfortunate effects included the privileging of particular subjectivities (whether 
these belong to the critic or the poet) who could be considered professional distillers of 
the “lived,” but also the way that “experience” often suggests phenomena that had 
occurred (and had been reflected on) rather than something that was on-going, and 
existing in pre-articulated state. 
 The term “feeling” would also have had a particular resonance within 
anthropology at Cambridge in the 1930s and 40s, and would, importantly, have 
signalled a specific ambition for anthropology. Anthropology was first established at 
Cambridge in 1908 in the wake of the university-backed anthropological expedition to 
Torres Straits, organised and directed by A. C. Haddon in 1898-9. This expedition is 
often understood as the first instance of intensive and wide-ranging anthropological 
fieldwork, a moment when the ethnographer left the colonial veranda, so to say, to go in 
search of “native” culture. What also characterised the Torres Straits expedition was the 
range of approaches it deployed: psychology, biology, physical anthropology, 
ethnography, geography, and so on. It became the basis for what at Cambridge became 
known as the intensive study. But by the 1930s Cambridge was not the centre of 
anthropological innovation in Britain. Often operating as a training college for colonial 
administrators the more innovative fieldwork was being conducted under the 
directorship of Malinowski at the London School of Economics, or by the social 
anthropologists at Oxford. It was precisely in this context that a younger generation of 
anthropological concerns were circulating in Cambridge. 
 One example can be seen in Gregory Bateson who was a central figure within 
anthropology at Cambridge in the 1930s. It was Bateson who was the main advocate in 
Britain of Ruth Benedict’s approach to anthropology with her insistence that 
anthropologists attend to the “emotional background of a culture,” or what she termed 
the “ethos” of a culture.16 For Benedict “feeling” was the pattern through which 
ordinary cultural activities could be understood as part of a general form of life. It is not 
hard to see why Benedict’s work would have such a powerful influence on Bateson: in 
the early 1930s Bateson saw his project as taking the overly-technical aspect of social 
anthropology into a broader approach to culture: “I was especially interested in studying 
what I called the ‘feel’ of culture, and I was bored with the conventional study of the 
more formal details.”17 It was precisely in an attempt to attend to the “feel” of culture 
that Bateson set off to New Guinea to study the Iatmul people for his 1936 book Naven, 
a book reliant on Benedict’s use of the term “ethos” which Bateson glosses as “the 
expression of a culturally standardised system of organisation of the instincts and 
emotions of the individuals”, which was to be distinguished from “eidos” which named 
structures of law, declared belief, kinship practices and so on.18 Such an approach to the 
study of culture takes us close to the concerns of “Cambridge English.” To get a sense 
of the feel of culture (to register the ethos of a culture, in other words) required 
ethnographers in the field to practice a form of practical criticism. They had to be able 
to attend to utterances and practices of an unfamiliar culture in a similar way to the way 
that Richards attended to a poem, by being attuned to the “sense, feeling, tone, and 
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intention” of the utterance: to develop an ear for a culture, so as to be able to recognise 
irony, jokes, teasing, self-deprecation, emotional force, as well as lightness, triviality, 
and so on. Such an anthropology was emphasising the practical in practical criticism. 
 But Benedict was not just an influential figure in Cambridge anthropology, her 
work was essential for the “structures of feeling” project that Williams had set himself. 
It is here that Williams’ so-called “left Leavisism” is better understood as the 
deployment of Benedict’s “patterns of culture” approach now directed at industrial, 
capitalist culture and its histories of structural inequalities (in this sense “patterns of 
feeling” might be another way of saying “structures of feeling”). Williams’ politics is 
not necessarily an addition to this approach, it is, rather, part of the reason for his 
attraction towards it. Benedict’s approach, for instance, led her to denouncing the 
configuration of US capitalism and its “emotional background,” as it is represented and 
explored in a book like Middletown, as fundamentally wasteful and inefficient (and 
thereby failing on its own terms).19 Williams’ debt to Benedict is profound; it is what 
allows him to write about “cultural form” as well as “structures of feeling.” And 
because it is so fundamental it often goes under-acknowledged by Williams. But in the 
early years her work is a constant reference: for instance in his discussion of how to 
analyse a world made up of “newspapers, magazines and best-seller fiction, 
advertisements and propaganda” as well as “broadcasting and the cinema; architecture 
and town planning” he characterises Patterns of Culture as a book “so distinguished that 
it cannot wisely be omitted from an essential reading list.”20 For Williams an attention 
to cultural feelings takes Richards’ practical criticism into the living world of industrial 
capitalism through Benedict’s insistence on ethos. “Feelings” becomes a word that 
allows him to be sensitive and attentive to attitudes and attunements (practices of 
generosity, of neighbourliness, for instance) as well as to what could be called the 
energies of culture: the rising and falling quota of hope, of political fatigue, the amount 
of energy that can resource projects of collective action, and so on. And it is because of 
this sensitivity that “feeling” is a particularly useful word for attaching to “taste.”  
 
Steedman’s Dream 
 
 What is taste? What sort of genre would frame it? Does taste belong to a 
naturalistic genre made up of actual shopping baskets and spent leisure time, where the 
“best” of intentions (“this year I will join a book club,” “no more ready-meals for me”) 
are often dashed on the rocks of ingrained routines, tiredness, and contingency? Or does 
taste belong to a more romantic genre, the kind where we are illuminated on our best 
side by the light of a consumer survey, for instance, that allows us to say “yes we like 
all kinds of music from rap to opera”? Or perhaps it belongs to a genre closer to fantasy 
fiction, or action and adventure? Perhaps taste eats away at us with frustrations and 
bitterness because our attractions and desires are fantastically out of line with the 
limitations of the life that has swept us along? Perhaps taste is the name we sometimes 
give to the lives we will never have lived. Perhaps, though, our taste finds a new 
incubating home in a community choir or a drawing class and this becomes the guiding 
light in a continually unfolding sensorial adventure? To treat taste as feeling means 
treating it as having different quantities of energy, different agencies in our lives, 
different orienting forces, and suggests that we will need to range across genres rather 
than be beholden to a single genre that wants to treat taste as a symbolic acquisition (for 
instance) within a repetitive serial drama. It might mean that at times we will need to 
heed Georges Bataille’s gothic challenge: “I defy any lover of painting to love a picture 
as much as a fetishist loves a shoe.”21 
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Treating taste as feeling might then require that we mobilise different kinds of 
evidence to address taste. In the mid-1980s the cultural studies writer Dick Hebdige 
wondered “what would it be like for a sociology that could consider dreams” as the 
material for attending to taste. In a passage that has the same heuristic ambition as 
Williams’ quotation about the register of the “lived” Hebdige writes: 
  
If sociology is concerned with the discovery and examination of invisible, 
impalpable structures which cannot be directly apprehended in experience but 
which nonetheless condition everything that passes as social experience, then 
what can sociology do with the unconscious, what can it do with those invisible, 
impossible, imaginary structures we inhabit every night as we sleep? What kind 
of sociology would take dreams as “data”?22 
 
Hebdige doesn’t pursue the literal implications of a dream sociology, though there 
would have been examples of just such sociological projects that he could have 
examined.23 Instead he looks at the physically manifest taste dreams that his male 
neighbors have established in the multi-ethnic street in London where he was living. 
These realized taste dreams often take the form of cars: 
 
With the windows wound down and the bodywork gleaming, the street filled 
with the pulsing rhythms of reggae or (more commonly these days) the stuttering 
beat of rap, electro funk and jazz, the car serves as an assertion of the owner’s 
physical presence, of corporeal pleasure against the work ethic and as a 
provocation to the police who in my neighbourhood still insist on regarding cars 
driven by young black men as stolen property. Here – amongst the young single 
men, both black and white – the car can be used to perpetuate the fantasy of the 
male as a self-sufficient, possibly dangerous predator […] out to get what’s 
his.24  
 
It is an area of taste that has also been pursued by Paul Gilroy in his essays on the role 
of the automobile in African-American culture as part of a repertoire of feelings where 
the automobile offers a particular form of freedom within a moral economy governed to 
a large extent by the logic of the commodity. For Gilroy, the automobile both offers and 
withholds freedom (for instance it “confiscates the possibility of collective experience, 
synchronised suffering, and acting in concert”) and rather than simply reflecting 
racialized and segregated social positions it “becomes the instrument of segregation and 
privatisation, not an aid to their overcoming.”25 Their freedom is in this sense coercive. 
The taste for automobiles, then, is never simply symbolic of status, it is always 
entangled with historic feelings of freedom, mobility, and privacy that are shaped by the 
realities of gender, race and class, while also materially shaping these life-worlds.    
But if Hebdige had wanted an example of how dreams could be used to pursue 
the social investigation of taste more literally there was an example very close at hand. 
Carolyn Steedman’s Landscape for a Good Woman: A Story of Two Lives had been 
published the year before Hebdige’s article. Steedman’s book was an innovative attempt 
to explore gendered class experience as it was animated by feelings of envy, bitterness 
and longing, and how “taste” and its frustrations was the critical engine of these 
feelings. And its central piece of evidence was a dream. The dream in question is the 
author’s childhood dream about her mother. Steedman remembers dreaming of her 
mother when she was just a small child (three years old, to be precise), and it is a dream 
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dense with wish-fulfilments that are vying for space amongst feelings of guilt and 
anxiety. The central motif of the dream is a coat: 
 
She [Steedman’s mother] wore the New Look, a coat of beige gabardine which 
fell in two swaying, graceful pleats from her waist at the back (the swaying must 
have come from very high heels, but I didn’t notice her shoes), a hat tipped 
forward from hair swept up at the back. She hurried, something jerky about her 
movements, a nervous, agitated walk, glancing round at me as she moved across 
the foreground. Several times she turned and came some way back towards me, 
admonishing, shaking her finger.26 
 
The dream is not Steedman’s wish-fulfilment, or not straightforwardly. It is Steedman’s 
mother who wanted, but couldn’t afford, the New Look coat, with all its luxurious 
extravagance of swathes of fabric during a time when rationing was still in force (the 
New Look was a French design promoted in North American fashion journalism as the 
latest “must have” look).27 The daughter wishes for her mother’s satisfaction of her 
desire, while also sensing that such a satisfaction won’t be satisfying. In the dream her 
mother has achieved her goal but she is still disappointed in her role and her small 
charge, still hurrying her along, still striving. 
 Steedman writes about class-consciousness, but her approach is explicitly 
framed by the question “what becomes of class-consciousness when it is seen as a 
structure of feeling”?28 The shift from investigating the registration of class as a form of 
consciousness and cognition to exploring the way that class features in what Richards 
called the “conative-affective aspects of life” (with its “nuance of interest”) allows 
Steedman to show how taste (the desire for particular forms of life) produce and 
reproduces particular patterns of feelings, and how it has particular political outcomes: 
 
My mother’s longing shaped my own childhood. From a Lancashire mill town 
and a working-class twenties childhood she came away wanting: fine clothes, 
glamour, money; to be what she wasn’t. However that longing was produced in 
her distant childhood, what she actually wanted were real things, real entities, 
things she materially lacked, things that a culture and a social system withheld 
from her. The story she told was about this wanting, and it remained a resolutely 
social story. When the world didn’t deliver the goods, she held the world to 
blame. In this way, the story she told was a form of political analysis, that allow 
a political interpretation to be made of her life.29 
 
The stories that Steedman’s mother knew were the fairy stories where “a goose-girl can 
marry a king.”30 They were tales of class mobility that figured the female subject as 
socially fluid precisely through the mechanisms of taste (the female subject who can 
“look the part” through clothing and make-up, through deportment and manners – 
through a New Look coat). 
 The political outcome of this constellation of narrative genre, social and cultural 
form (the fashion industry, for instance), and taste-feelings was emphatic: “she became 
a working-class Conservative, the only political form that allowed her to reveal the 
politics of envy.”31 But rather than treat this as a form of class misrecognition, 
Steedman instead offers the possibility that this envy has a gendered genesis and a 
critical potential. As Sianne Ngai suggests, envy has had a particularly gendered history 
in that it is used in “describing a subject who lacks, rather than the subject’s affective 
response to a perceived inequality.”32 It is as a critical feeling that envy can point to the 
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contradiction between the social promise that is entered into under the name of 
neoliberal capitalism and its ontologically unequal distribution of resources. Envy is the 
feeling produced in the cauldron of this contradiction: it is at once a critique of the 
narratives that promise so much, and evidence of the way that we can become deeply 
attached to the very promises that are so systematically broken. Envy, then, is a feeling 
attached to a taste: it is the shape that a taste takes, its colour and form. 
 In the light of Lauren Berlant’s recent work it would seem clear that Steedman is 
describing a form of “cruel optimism,” a situation where “people stay attached to 
conventional good-life fantasies – say of enduring reciprocity in couples, families, 
political systems, institutions, markets, and at work – when the evidence of their 
instability, fragility, and dear cost abounds.”33 Berlant’s project is important as an 
example of an investigative method that pays particular attention not just to the objects 
of someone’s attachment but to the very form that that attachment takes (its strength, 
tone and scale). It is no wonder that Berlant has also been attentive to Steedman’s 
genre-transforming book. In her commentary on Landscape for a Good Woman, Berlant 
recognises how Steedman’s mother’s longing for a particular form of clothing can be 
read as a cathected projection of a range of social desires and demands: 
 
She [Steedman] suggests that these conventions of the beautiful object [the New 
Look coat, for instance] convey a less-enunciated desire for a world that can 
sustain families, love, and dignity and that can overcome the economic strain 
and shame that working people experience in their effort to reach the plateau of 
satisfaction, the unanxious space and time of attainment that is the “good 
woman’s” fantasy. Much of the work and the moving, monitoring, and 
accumulative fussing that go into survival as well as into the reconditioning of 
the social body are condensed in objects.34 
 
What Berlant seems to point to is a “fetishism-from-below”, so to say, where objects are 
invested with magical properties to overcome the “strain and shame” of a lived 
actuality. Bundled into that coat are stories of another life, a “corrected” life, where the 
goose-girl did marry the king because she was a good woman. 
 The components of Steedman’s mother’s taste are a complex network of 
relationships held together by a fierce envy for an impossible object (the fantasised and 
missing coat). Between Steedman’s mother and the missing coat are a tangle of threads 
that weave together a story that is regional (a journey from a Lancashire mill town to 
London), national (where the immediate post-war years in Britain witnessed intense 
privations of material goods through rationing), and international (where the United 
States, especially in magazines, featured as a land of plenty where everyone could 
partake in the billowing fashion of the New Look). It is a story built (quite literally) out 
of threads and regrets: if she were still living in Lancashire the necessary cloth for the 
coat (which is the rightful inheritance of generations of weavers) would have been 
available “at the side door of the mill”; if she hadn’t had children, who knows which 
“king” she could marry, and how much cloth she could use for her coat? And, of course, 
it is a tale made out of the materialities of gender and class articulated via fashion. But it 
is not a general story about class and gender but one articulated through the singularities 
of feeling, and it is this set of feelings of envy and regret, that fashion a consciousness 
that feels the actuality of gender (a “good” woman) and class (where working-class 
aristocracy is not an oxymoron) not as a collectivity of shared interests but as a sea of 
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 This register of taste-as-feeling requires an approach to taste that doesn’t see a 
preference as already positioned within a hierarchy of symbolic value. It requires an 
approach to taste that recognises that the materiality of taste, as well as what matters 
about taste, is the feelings through which a taste is animated. In this way feeling, within 
the full conative-affective register suggested by I. A. Richards, is the vehicle for taste: it 
is the energy that orients us towards things; it is the modality of our attunement towards 
sensorial culture; and it is the shape and colour that our attachments make in the world. 
We can get much closer to an understanding of taste-as-feeling by looking at the work 
of Antoine Hennion. 
 
 Taste as Attachment, Taste as Orientation, Taste as Attunement 
 
Writing in the wake of Bourdieu’s critical sociology and in direct response to his 
legacy, the French sociologist Antoine Hennion forges a path that could be described 
under the banner “neither Kant, nor Bourdieu.” Hennion’s approach to taste is founded 
on two refusals: that taste is a “property of goods” and that taste “is it a competence of 
people.” Instead, for Hennion, “taste is a way of building relationships, with things and 
with people.”35 Aligned with “Actor-Network Theory” and clearly inspired by the 
investigation of quotidian practices and poetics that Michel de Certeau, Luce Giard and 
Pierre Mayol undertook in the late 1970s, Hennion’s approach to taste is a substantial 
challenge to the orthodoxy that sees taste primarily as the display of cultural capital.36 
For over thirty years he has been following the particularities of taste through work that 
is ethnographic, historical and theoretical. His privileged subject is the amateur (the one 
who loves) and while he has often focused on musical amateurs (non-professional 
musicians, concert-goers – the whole panoply of “music users” in Hennion’s terms), he 
has also investigated wine tasters, amateurs in sport, and drug users.37 
 Rather than offering an overview of Hennion’s oeuvre I want to pick out three 
elements that characterise Hennion’s sociology of taste; elements that offer a vivid 
contrast to the sociological practices of Bourdieu and his inheritors; elements that 
provide valuable materials for connecting to Williams, Benedict and Steedman, and for 
concocting an understanding of taste as feeling. To start with, and somewhat ironically, 
Hennion’s sociology of taste starts out by “de-sociologizing” taste. This, like many of 
his positions, was the outcome of empirical work: “People are now so ‘sociologized’ 
that when you ask them what their musical tastes are, they will begin by apologizing: 
‘my family was very middle-class, I was taught by a private tutor, my sister played the 
violin…’”38 He had to learn a way of talking to people (and a way of listening to them) 
so that they didn’t simply provide the data that they thought he wanted to hear. To do 
this he reversed the authority by which sociology enters into a relationship with its 
informants. In the new relationship it is the informant who is the expert on the 
pragmatics of their taste, or as Hennion succinctly puts it “the explained becomes the 
explainer.”39 To do this required changes in practice: it meant that interviews became 
conversations, often soliloquys by the informants; it meant that these discussions often 
took place at a taste “site” (a room where music was listened to, for instance); and it 
meant working with much longer passages of verbatim conversation in essays and 
articles so that the weight of writing was often balanced towards the informants. 
 As part of this shift in authority, Hennion has developed an attention towards the 
event of taste: that is, instead of treating taste as an accomplishment or as something 
completed, he treats it as an activity, an action that is ongoing. In attending to the event 
of taste (or to the endless events of taste) Hennion’s sociology is sensitized to taste as an 
activity that requires gestures, routines, instruments, techniques and so on. Some of 
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these requirements are elaborate techno-aesthetic instruments (a room with a hi-fi, some 
shelves with CDs and a sofa for lying on) but others are constituted by minor gestures. 
As an example of the latter he describes a dinner party where one person takes a drink 
of wine while continuing the conversation, but where another “stops an instant, takes 
two small sniffs, drinks again” before re-joining the conversation.40 What makes this an 
event of taste is not the adjudication of a discernment (the display of an educated 
palate), but the self-reflexive “moment” of pausing whereby the taster experiences 
themselves tasting. For Hennion:    
 
This moment marks itself by the surge of an intensified contact, provoking a 
shift between the self towards the object, and a shift of the object towards the 
self. What the minimal word “attention” expresses so lightly and so well – in a 
single movement, like the taster’s gesture – these two displacements which make 
contact, grant attention to, capture the attention of.41 
 
It is this dual movement of the self, moving towards the object and the object, moving 
towards the self that marks the event of taste for the amateur, and is the overarching 
theme of Hennion’s investigations. He finds this dual movement again and again in the 
way an amateur rock climber is oriented towards the ropes and cleats that they are 
using, in the way a music enthusiast practices with an ensemble, and so on.  
 Lastly, Hennion’s work, is fundamentally historical. Unusually for work that is 
often primarily ethnographic, it is underwritten by a broad understanding of large 
historical shifts in cultural practices. Hennion’s historical inspiration is taken from art 
history, primarily from those art historians such Svetlana Alpers and Michael 
Baxandall, who are inordinately attentive to the gestures, mediations, techniques, and 
exchanges that constitute the social act of painting.42 In this light it could be said that 
Hennion aims to register the “period ear” of listening as it is transformed over three 
centuries of music as a social practice.43 So that when he claims that “it took over three 
hundred years of practices and inventions to create our way of loving music”44 he has in 
mind a shift in the “period ear” from someone in the congregation “in a Protestant 
church in Leipzig, listening to the word of God embellished by a cantata which was 
intended, according to the rhetoric of the time, to ensure that worshippers understood 
the religious text, were swayed by its imagery and could memorize it more easily,” to a 
modern day music lover who can “buy the complete cantatas of Bach on CD at the local 
Virgin Megastore.”45 
 This brief account of the characteristic elements of Hennion’s practice hopefully 
can shine some light on what Hennion means when he repeatedly claims that taste is 
“another declension of the word ‘attachment’.”46 I think it is clear that he doesn’t mean 
just that we have a psychological attachment to those things that we hold dear (taste is 
not simply the repository of cathected investments). He is using the world much more 
pragmatically as a word that signifies the materiality of a meeting, a joining, a 
connecting to the world. In this way taste is the way we make contact with a sensorial 
world. And it names the way that the sensorial world unfurls towards us as we bend to 
meet it. Taste, for Hennion then, is a form of attachment because it is also a form of 
attunement (it is the work of repeated tastings) and a form of orientation (even if this 
orientation is just to pause for a few second to attend to the event of taste). In Hennion’s 
work “attachment” is a cognate for “attention” and for “feeling” in the broad conative-
affective sense of the word. Feeling is the fundamental mode of our attachments: it 
designates the materiality of a curiosity in discovering (a feeling-out of the world) as 
well as the self-reflexivity of taste (to feel oneself feeling, which could be a primary 
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description of the amateur’s sense of taste).47 The feelings of taste might be the material 
practices of musical habits (for instance reading about new CD releases) and they might 
be the oceanic feeling of rapture when music “takes one out of oneself” in a transport of 
delight. Most often tastes are the layered complex feelings of multiple events that point 
to the unfinished work of our own world-making. In one moving account of “music 
using” a middle-aged man describes how growing up gay in the provinces led to him 
feeling “completely lousy, abject” and how joining a choir “transfigured” him:  
 
I can't tell you how much enjoyment I got out of those sessions. Even now it's a 
very special moment in my life. Of course there were good looking guys (and 
ugly ones) but that wasn't it, I felt good that's all, I used my voice as a means to 
be with them.48 
 
In a few lines an informant reveals a world of feelings: of joy; of using his voice; of 
being with others. What is this feeling? Can we name it? What would Raymond 
Williams have called it as a feeling? I think he might have called it (as he did when he 
described his father’s attachment to non-conformist chapels in Wales) a feeling for 
democracy. I think anyone who signs in a choir, who uses their voice “as a means to be 
with others”, whether in community choir or in a church choir, knows that feeling. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I started this essay by claiming that the problem with surrendering an account of taste to 
the critical sociology of Bourdieu, and his inheritors, is that it fails to account for taste 
on either the micro-level of material practices (the tasting of taste, so to say) or at the 
macro-level of significant, often transnational, historical shifts in taste and in the 
conveyors of taste. The perspective that Bourdieu promotes is the middle-ground 
perspective where the relationships of figure (subjects) and ground (society) are already 
established, and where the figure has an already allocated place (is already 
representative of a class, an echelon). To wrestle taste away from this perspective could 
mean promoting viewpoints that are both “up-close and personal” as well as offering a 
more distanced historical perspective. Alongside this I believe that we need to examine 
the shapes that tastes take; the way that they are freighted with feeling; the way that they 
are carried on the backs of particular “ethoses” while simultaneously shaping them.  
 My taste for strawberry rather than raspberry jam, doesn’t particularly matter to 
me; I wouldn’t spit out a raspberry jam sandwich if I was offered one. On a conative-
affective register is has a low intensity. John Coltrane’s Olé matters to me more. Tastes 
like this aren’t “finished”: Coltrane’s record is still working on me, unfurling itself, 
offering itself up as an explanation as to how a piece of music might constitute one long 
crescendo without getting any louder or faster. We are made and unmade as we attach 
ourselves to sensorial worlds. Both a variety of fruit jams as well as an endless supply 
of jazz albums are easily available to me. I live in a place and time of plenty (at least 
where jam and jazz are concerned). Across the road is a small supermarket offering a 
small selection of jams. A few doors down is an organic greengrocer where more 
expensive jams can be purchased. I’m lucky I have the money for either. A few 
generations ago my jam-oriented tastes would have been dependent on my preserving 
and jam-making skills. Similarly, today my taste for Coltrane can easily be addressed 
through the seemingly bottomless archives of online streaming services and YouTube. 
When I first listened to Olé my choices were limited: I had about twenty-five albums 
and a small mono Dansette record player – to buy a vinyl LP was not a matter to be 
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taken lightly. It wasn’t a moment of material privation (no ration books for LPs), yet 
against today’s superabundance the record’s singularity, and the feelings it promoted, 
was partly dependent on its relative rarity. 
 To attend to taste as feeling is also to attend to the mechanisms of culture’s 
dissemination; for instance, the circulation of US lifestyle magazines in Britain in the 
1940s and 50s. These mediations are not some sort of supplement to the object of taste 
(the New Look), they are an intricate part of that world of taste. Similarly, the 
opportunities we have for declaring our taste feelings is also part of the ensemble of the 
social practice of cultural tastes. Today, for instance, I can signal my appreciation or 
lack of it at every moment of taste’s unfolding: I can place emoji of small round faces, 
where red heart-shaped eyes pulse with love, or sad blue ones drip with tears; I can 
register my “thumbs up” in response to an amateur choir, a painting by a friend, or a 
cute cat video that is doing the rounds on social media.   
 In the world of taste, it is easy to get drawn to charismatic taste events (ecstatic 
concerts, delicious foods) and the intensity of feelings that taste and distaste can 
summon (moments of disgust, of envy, of regret). We need Steedman’s mother’s 
envious and regretful tastes to remind ourselves that the world of taste isn’t simply 
orchestrated according to the loves of amateurs. But perhaps we also need to attend to 
other feelings that are concerned with less-intense flavours and feelings. And this is 
where I think it is worth going back to Raymond Williams and Ruth Benedict who often 
recognise much more work-a-day versions of feelings: the way culture subdues 
emotions, manages affects, and flattens feelings. Taste-as-feelings, share a family 
resemblance with the “attunements and atmospheres” that Heidegger sees as central to 
mood, to Stimmung. In Heidegger’s writing on Stimmung (in 1929-30) he reminds us 
that the most important moods might well be the ones that we don’t recognise as moods: 
“and precisely those attunements to which we pay no heed at all, the attunements we 
least observe, those attunements which attune us in such a way that we as though there 
is no attunement there at all, as though we were not attuned in any way at all – these 
attunements are the most powerful.”49 By insisting that mood and attunement are 
constitutional of our sense of being in the world, Heidegger makes it clear that there are 
no mood-less states.50 Can we say the same thing about taste? Can we say that a taste-
feeling circulates even when our preferences seem at their least emphatic, when we 
simply seem to be partaking in what might be considered a “period taste”? What are the 
surreptitious tastes that constitute the low-intensity world of taste? Is the taste for 
convenience just this kind of taste?  
 When Raymond Williams sought to provide an audit of the emergent “structures 
of feelings” of “Britain in the 1960s” in his 1961 book The Long Revolution he noted 
that “the real power of institutions” was “that they actively teach particular ways of 
feeling.”51 We could also say that they teach taste-feelings: ways of attaching ourselves 
to sensorial worlds. The recent concern (if two decades can count as recent) within the 
human sciences over the “critical paranoia” that academic institutions seem to foster can 
be seen as a concern with the taste-feelings it teaches and promotes. My sense is that 
such concerns will continue to grow as we will all recognise that need to foster new 
taste-feelings that will require us to attune ourselves toward the world in less 
environmentally destructive ways. The fight for climate justice and for social justice 
will require deep changes in taste, and deep changes in how we feel towards the world 
and towards each other. Community choirs might seem like a trivial matter but in the 
fostering of democratic taste feelings they might well be significant. 
My claim for this essay was that I wanted to “lay the groundwork for seeing 
taste as an agent in sensorial change by treating it as a feeling, or range of feelings.” I 
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have brought together what I realise is an odd mix of writers that don’t sit easily 
together, either tonally or in terms of their research practices. I think that one of the 
seductions of Bourdieu’s approach to taste is that it has a certain aesthetic sensibility to 
it that generates a taste feeling. There is something aesthetically satisfying and seductive 
about the symmetry he produces between a world of cultural practices and social 
positions that he maps onto them. It is a complete picture. But that is its problem, its 
limitation. Here, on the other hand, I have sought to foster another kind of aesthetic 
form that I recognise is less complete and often courts asymmetry. In championing a 
gaze that treats tastes as simultaneously an endless series of micro-practices and an 
unfolding evolution of macro-practices I am also championing a practice that can move 
between and across the sensual description of a specific event of taste and the broad 
historical changes to our sensorial worlds.  
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